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MANSMANN,  Circuit Judge. 
 
 Debtor Susan Judd appeals from a decision of the 
district court, affirming the bankruptcy court's denial of her 
motion to reopen her bankruptcy case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 
§350(b).  Judd sought to reopen her no-asset Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
case for the sole purpose of amending her schedules to add a 
creditor whose name had been omitted. 
 We are confronted with a question of first impression 
for us:  if a debtor, in a Chapter 7, no-asset, no-bar date 
bankruptcy proceeding fails to list a claim on its schedule of 
creditors and the bankruptcy case is closed, is the debt 
nonetheless discharged pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(b) and 
523(a)(3), or must the debtor move the bankruptcy court, pursuant 
to 11 U.S.C. § 350(b), for an order reopening the closed 
proceeding to add the omitted creditor for the purpose of 
discharging the claim?   
 We hold that in a no-asset, no-bar date case, 
dischargeability is unaffected by scheduling.  After a case is 
closed, the debt in question was either discharged or excepted 
from discharge based on sections 523 and 727(b).  Therefore, the 
filing of a motion to reopen is not necessary to discharge the 
debt if the statutory exceptions to discharge do not apply. 
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I.0 
 Susan Judd and Lawrence Wolfe were married on December 
27, 1985.  They separated on January 15, 1990 and subsequently 
were divorced on April 26, 1991. 
 After the parties separated, Judd remained in the 
marital home.  On December 24, 1990, pursuant to Article 2, 
Paragraph 2.2 of the Property Settlement Agreement incorporated 
into their Final Judgment of Divorce, Wolfe executed a quitclaim 
deed which conveyed the marital home at 127 E. 7th Street, 
Burlington, New Jersey, to Judd.  Judd agreed to assume 
responsibility to pay the outstanding mortgage and to indemnify 
Wolfe in the event that he had to make any payments on the 
mortgage.0  Judd continued to pay the monthly mortgage payments 
on the home until February, 1993.  On February 22, 1993, 
financial circumstances caused Judd to file a Chapter 7 petition 
in bankruptcy.  Judd's Chapter 7 petition listed the home at 127 
E. 7th Street as an asset on Schedule "A" of the petition, with a 
fair market value of $93,000.00, subject to a secured claim of 
$92,014.75.  The first mortgagee on the property, Mortgage Access 
Corporation, was listed under Schedule "D" of Judd's petition as 
                                                           
0
 We recite the facts as Judd alleges them.  It should be 
understood, therefore, that our recitation does not constitute 
findings. 
0
 Prior to the marriage, the marital home was owned by 
Judd.  Judd obtained the property through equitable distribution 
in a prior divorce proceeding. 
 
 In December, 1989, Judd conveyed an equal interest in 
the marital home to Wolfe.  Upon this conveyance, the parties 
refinanced the existing first mortgage, borrowing additional 
money to consolidate debts and make home improvements.  The 
parties executed a note and a mortgage. 
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a secured creditor with a claim of $92,014.75.  Due to the fact 
that Wolfe was also obligated on the mortgage, this debt --listed 
as a home mortgage -- was listed as a joint debt on Schedule "D" 
of Judd's petition.  Although her attorney listed the debt as a 
joint debt on Schedule "D" of the bankruptcy petition, he did not 
list Wolfe as a creditor or co-debtor. Because she had no other 
assets available for distribution to her creditors in bankruptcy, 
no bar date was set by the court establishing a deadline for 
creditors to file proofs of claim. 
 On February 25, 1993, after reviewing Judd's Chapter 7 
petition, the Bankruptcy Court Clerk, in accordance with the 
applicable rules, notified the creditors listed in Judd's 
schedules of the date set for the meeting of creditors and the 
last day for the filing of complaints to determine the 
dischargeability of debts pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(c).  In 
accordance with Bankruptcy Rule 2002(e), no deadline for filing 
claims was set; rather, creditors were notified that it was 
unnecessary to file claims as there were no assets to distribute. 
However, in accordance with Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c), a deadline 
for filing complaints pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(c) to determine 
the dischargeability of certain debts was set.  This deadline of 
May 25, 1993, passed without any complaints being filed.  On 
April 29, 1993 the trustee abandoned his interest in the marital 
home.  On July 14, 1993, Judd received a Discharge in Bankruptcy. 
On July 16, 1993, Judd's case was closed.   
 In March, 1994, after Judd's bankruptcy case was 
closed, the first mortgagee, Mortgage Access Corporation, filed a 
6 
complaint in foreclosure listing both Judd and Wolfe as 
defendants.  Subsequently, Wolfe sought indemnification from Judd 
pursuant to their property settlement.0  Accordingly, on August 
15, 1994, Judd filed a motion to reopen her Chapter 7 proceedings 
so that she could list Wolfe as a creditor and discharge her 
obligation to him.  In his August 31, 1994, opposition, Wolfe 
alleged that he learned for the first time in July, 1994, that 
Judd had filed for bankruptcy, that she had not paid the mortgage 
for over one and one-half years, and that a complaint in 
foreclosure had been filed.  According to Wolfe, despite the 
facts that Judd lives within a couple of miles of him, knows 
where he lives, has been to his home, knows where he works and 
knows his phone number, she never communicated anything to him 
regarding either her failure to make mortgage payments since 
January 1993 or the filing of the foreclosure suit.0 
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 In July 1994, Wolfe filed a motion to enforce his 
rights under the Judgment of Divorce and Property Settlement 
Agreement in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, 
Burlington County.  Wolfe asked the court to:  (1) order Judd to 
satisfy the present mortgage arrearages for the former marital 
residence; or alternatively, direct Judd to execute a quit claim 
deed to the former marital residence in favor of Wolfe; (2) 
direct Judd to reimburse Wolfe for all costs he had or would 
incur with respect to the foreclosure of the property; (3) award 
Wolfe the immediate right of possession; (4) award Wolfe counsel 
fees; and (5) impose any other equitable relief the court deems 
just.  Judd opposed Wolfe's motion.  The motion was granted and 
the case is now pending before the Superior Court of New Jersey, 
Appellate Division. 
0
 Upon obtaining all of this information, Wolfe contacted 
the mortgage company, which agreed to reinstate the mortgage if 
he cured the arrearages.  He claimed he had the ability to obtain 
a home equity loan on his existing home for this purpose, but 
7 
 Wolfe opposed Judd's motion to reopen on the grounds of 
unfair prejudice.  Wolfe's primary concern was that his credit 
worthiness would be harmed as a result of Judd's failure to pay 
the mortgage.  In addition, he was concerned that he would be 
liable for any deficiency at a foreclosure sale.  Wolfe opined 
that if he had been listed as a creditor initially, he would have 
received notice of the bankruptcy and could have taken steps at 
that time to take over the property, pay the mortgage, avoid 
additional interest and penalties and avoid any damage to his 
credit.0 
 On September 12, 1994, finding that Wolfe had 
demonstrated that he would be prejudiced by a reopening, the 
bankruptcy court denied Judd's motion to reopen.0  The bankruptcy 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
would only do so if he owned Judd's residence, which he was 
seeking in the state court action.   
 
 Wolfe estimated that the mortgage arrearages for the 
property from January, 1993 to August 31, 1994, were over 
$20,000.  Wolfe stated further that there was no equity in the 
property.  The house was worth $96,000.00 with a principal 
balance of $92,000.00, plus the $20,000 in arrearages. 
 
0
 Judd contended that she had given her attorney a copy 
of the Divorce Judgment and Property Settlement Agreement, 
quitclaim deed and mortgage payment slip, advising him that the 
debt to Mortgage Access Corporation was a joint debt with Wolfe. 
She asserted that she relied upon the expertise of her bankruptcy 
counsel and that she was not aware of the fact that Wolfe had not 
been listed as a creditor.  In any event, she maintains the 
failure to list Wolfe was not done maliciously, intentionally or 
with an attempt to defraud or harm him. 
  
0
 The bankruptcy court found that: 
 
Here, there is no question that prejudice has 
been experienced by the potential creditor, 
in terms of the growth of the balance due to 
the mortgage company by the lack of 
8 
court subsequently denied Judd's motion for reconsideration filed 
pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 3(b) and F.R.B.P. 8002(b).0   
 On appeal to the United States District Court, the 
court affirmed the bankruptcy court's order denying Judd's motion 
to reopen.  In its decision, the district court did not reach the 
question of whether the debtor's obligations to Wolfe had been or 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
information provided to the creditor in this 
obligation.  She agreed to indemnify and hold 
harmless her ex-husband on this obligation, 
while he had availability to find out the 
status, he had no obligation to continue to 
review the status on an ongoing basis.  On 
the other hand, it was her obligation to 
advise him, at least, that she would not be 
able to indemnify him or that the obligation 
was growing when she ceased payments in 
January 1993 and then filed a bankruptcy 
petition in '93, and I believe left the house 
in January of '94 or February, perhaps. 
 
I believe that there is insufficient basis to 
reopen the Chapter 7 case, primarily because 
the creditor has shown himself to be 
prejudiced by such a reopening, and I will 
deny the motion.   
 
(JA 50-11 to 51-1). 
0
 Specifically, the bankruptcy court found: 
 
And while you might say that accrual of 
interest in and of itself is not the --
sufficient prejudice, is not the kind of 
prejudice that would justify denying the 
reopening and an adding of a creditor.  We 
looked at the global circumstances, if you 
will, to conclude that indeed, he was 
prejudiced, not only by the accrual of 
interest but -- the foregoing of options and 
by the negative impact on credit, that he 
could have avoided at the time if he would have been proper named 
in the ordinary course. . . .  If he had the burden of proof to 
show prejudice, he met that burden. 
 
(JA 56-18 to 21). 
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should be discharged, after deciding that that question was not 
properly before the court.  (JA 41). 
 The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) and (c).  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 158(d).   
 
II. 
 We begin with an examination of the scope of the 
discharge Judd received from the bankruptcy court.  Section 
727(b) of the Bankruptcy Code defines the scope of a Chapter 7 
debtor's discharge:  "Except as provided in section 523 of this 
title, a discharge under subsection (a) of this section 
discharged the debtor from all debts that arose before the date 
of the order for relief under this chapter . . . ."  11 U.S.C. 
§727(b).  (Emphasis added.)  As other courts have observed, "The 
operative word in this section is `all.'"  In re Beezley, 994 
F.2d 1433, 1435 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing In re Mendiola, 99 B.R. 
864, 865 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) (regarding § 727(b), a pre-
bankruptcy debt is discharged whether or not it is scheduled); In 
re Stecklow, 144 B.R. 314, 317 (Bankr. D. Md. 1992) ("breadth of 
the discharge" under section 727 is "comprehensive") and In re 
Thibodeau, 136 B.R. 7, 8 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992) ("§ 727(b) itself 
makes no exception for unlisted debts")).  Because section 
727(b), on its face, does not create an exception for unlisted or 
unscheduled debts, every prepetition debt is discharged under 
section 727(b) subject to the provisions of section 523(a)(3). We 
thus turn to section 523(a)(3).  
10 
 Section 523(a)(3) creates two categories of unscheduled 
debts:  (1) those that are "of a kind specified in paragraphs 
(2), (4), or (6) of this subsection," and (2) those that are not 
of such kind.0  Those debts that are not of the kind specified in 
paragraphs (2), (4), or (6) of section 523(a) are resolved by 
reference to section 523(a)(3)(A).     
 Section 523(a)(3)(A) excepts from discharge certain 
debts that were: 
Neither listed nor scheduled . . . in time to 
permit . . . timely filing of a proof of 
claim, unless such creditor had notice or 
actual knowledge of the case in time for such 
timely filing . . . . 
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 Section 523(a) provides in pertinent part: 
 
 (a)A discharge under 
section 727 . . . of this title 
does not discharge an individual 
debtor from any debt-- 
 
 (3)neither listed nor 
scheduled . . . in time to permit-- 
 
 (A)if such debt is not of 
a kind specified in paragraph (2), 
(4), or (6), of this subsection, 
timely filing of a proof of claim, 
unless such creditor had notice or 
actual knowledge of the case in 
time for such timely filing; or 
 
 (B)if such debt is a kind 
specified in paragraph (2), (4), or 
(6) of this subsection, timely 
filing of a proof of claim and 
timely request for a determination 
of dischargeability of such debt 
under one of such paragraphs, 
unless such 
creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the case in time for 
such filing and request[.] 
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Because this is a "no-asset" Chapter 7 case, the time for filing 
a claim has not, and never will, expire unless some exempt assets 
are discovered; thus, section 523(a)(3)(A) cannot be applied in 
Judd's circumstances.  See Stone v. Caplan, 10 F.3d 285, 289, 
n.13 (5th Cir. 1994) (observing that if no proof-of-claim 
deadline has ever been set, section 523(a)(3)(A), by its own 
terms, is inapplicable).  Because section 523(a)(3)(A) does not 
apply here, Judd's debt to Wolfe was discharged by operation of 
law at the time of her discharge on July 14, 1993, unless her 
debt to Wolfe falls under sections 523(a)(2), (4), or (6). 
 Debts listed in sections 523(a)(2), (4) and (6) 
describe debts which arise from intentional torts such as fraud. 
They include debts incurred by "false pretenses, false 
representation or actual fraud . . . " (523(a)(2)); debts 
incurred by "fraud or defalcation while acting as a fiduciary 
. . ." (523(a)(4)); and debts "for willful and malicious injury 
. . ." (523(a)(6)).  Section 523(a)(3)(B) excepts from discharge 
"intentional tort" debts that were not listed.  Since section 
523(c) provides that the dischargeability of these debts must be 
determined by the bankruptcy court and Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c) 
requires a complaint to be filed before the discharge is entered, 
section 523(a)(3)(B) preserves the right of these creditors to 
litigate the dischargeability of their debts.  
 For most creditors, the fundamental right enjoyed in 
bankruptcy is the right to file a proof of claim because filing a 
claim is obviously necessary in order to participate in the 
12 
distribution of the estate's assets.0  In re Stark, 717 F.2d 322 
(7th Cir. 1983).  Section 523(a)(3)(A) honors this right, by 
excepting from discharge, debts owed to creditors who did not 
know about the case in time to file a claim.  In a case where 
there are no assets to distribute, however, the right to file a 
proof of claim is a hollow one.0  An omitted creditor who would 
not have received anything even if he had been originally 
scheduled, has not been harmed by omission from the bankrupt's 
schedules and the lack of notice to file a proof of claim.  Thus, 
in a no-asset Chapter 7 case where no bar date has been set, we 
conclude that there would be no purpose served by reopening a 
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  For creditors holding intentional tort claims, the 
right to file a proof of claim exists parallel to the creditor's 
right to secure an adjudication of non-dischargeability. 
Accordingly, section 523(a)(3)(B) excepts intentional tort debts 
from discharge notwithstanding the creditor's failure to file a 
timely complaint under section 523(c), if the creditor did not 
know about the case in time to file such a complaint.  11 U.S.C. 
§ 523(c).  We do not understand Wolfe to be asserting such a 
claim before us at this time.   
 
 As § 523(a)(3)(B) applies only when the omitted claim 
is one which might have been excepted from discharge if the 
creditor had the opportunity to timely file a complaint under 
§523(a)(2), (4) or (6), and as Wolfe has conceded that he is not 
asserting such a cause of action, § 523(a)(3)(B) is inapplicable. 
0
 In recognition of this, Bankruptcy Rule 2002(e) allows 
a court to dispense with the necessity of filing proofs of claim 
in a no-asset case.  Bankruptcy Rule 2002(e) provides:   
 
In a Chapter 7 liquidation case, if it 
appears from the schedules that there are no 
assets from which a dividend can be paid, the 
notice of the meeting of creditors may 
include a statement to that effect; that it 
is unnecessary to file claims; and that if 
sufficient assets become available for the 
payment of a dividend, further notice will be 
given for the filing of claims. 
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case to add an omitted creditor to the bankrupt's schedules.   If 
the debt at issue is not a debt described under section 
523(a)(2), (4) or (6), the debt has been discharged by virtue of 
section 727(b), whether or not it was listed.  If, however, the 
debt is a debt that falls under sections 523(a)(2), (4) or (6), 
the debt is not discharged by virtue of section 523(a)(3)(B). 
 
III. 
 Believing that reopening her case and amending her 
schedules was necessary in order to discharge her debt to Wolfe, 
Judd moved to reopen her case pursuant to section 350(b) of the 
Bankruptcy Code.  This section provides that a bankruptcy case 
may be reopened ". . . to administer assets, to accord relief to 
the debtor or for other cause".  11 U.S.C. § 350(b).    
 Apparently, both the debtor and the creditor here 
labored under the misapprehension that the issue of whether 
Wolfe's claim was or was not discharged would be resolved, either 
explicitly or implicitly, by the court's decision on Judd's 
motion to reopen pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 350(b).  It appears that 
the bankruptcy judge also assumed that if Wolfe was not listed as 
a creditor, his claim would not be subject to discharge.  Because 
we have concluded that the issue of whether Wolfe's claim under 
the Property Settlement Agreement was or was not discharged, 
notwithstanding its lack of scheduling, is resolved by sections 
14 
727(b) and 523(a)(3)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, Judd's motion to 
reopen was unnecessary.0   
 Our interpretation of sections 727(b) and 523(a)(3) is 
consistent with that of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit.  In In re Beezley, 994 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1994), the 
debtor, Gilbert Beezley, appealed a decision affirming the 
bankruptcy court's denial of his motion to reopen his bankruptcy 
case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 350(b), arguing that the bankruptcy 
court abused its discretion by failing to grant his motion to 
reopen.  Based upon the assumption that an amendment was 
necessary to discharge a debt, Beezley sought to add an omitted 
debt to his schedules.  Beezley's case, like ours, was a no-
asset, no-bar date Chapter 7 case.  The Court of Appeals 
concluded that after such a case is closed, dischargeability is 
unaffected by scheduling if the omitted debt is the type of debt 
covered by 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3)(A), because it has already been 
discharged pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727(b).  The court noted as 
well that if the debt is the type of debt covered by 11 U.S.C. 
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 See In re Mendiola, 99 B.R. 864, 865 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
1989) (reopening the case to amend schedules would not affect the 
rights or liabilities of the parties, but would be an exercise in 
futility); In re Karamitsos, 88 B.R. 122 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1988) 
(the filing of an amended creditor schedule after discharge has 
been granted in a no-asset Chapter 7 case has absolutely no 
effect on the dischargeability of the debt); In re Guzman, 130 
B.R. 489 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991) (scheduling or not scheduling a 
creditor has no impact on whether the creditor's claim is 
discharged; § 727 extends discharge to all prepetition debts and 
applies without regard to whether the debt is listed in the 
schedules).  Accord In re Thibodeau, 136 B.R. 7 (Bankr. D. Mass. 
1992); In re Anderson, 72 B.R. 495 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987); In re 
Peacock, 139 B.R. 421 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1992). 
15 
§523(a)(3)(B), then it has not been discharged and is non-
dischargeable.0     
 In an attempt to evade Beezley's application to his 
case, Wolfe argues that his case has substantial factual 
differences from Beezley and the typical no asset case where the 
unscheduled creditor has either a judgment, a liquidated money 
claim or is a party to a consumer transaction with the debtor. 
Rather here, observes Wolfe, the debtor and the creditor were 
previously married, divorced, and the "claim" which the debtor is 
attempting to discharge is an indemnification agreement for a 
joint mortgage obligation incorporated into a Judgment of 
Divorce.  According to Wolfe, the relationship of the parties, 
the nature of the underlying debt at issue and the debtor's 
breach of the Property Settlement Agreement cry out for the 
"equitable approach" adopted by other courts and not the strictly 
mechanical approach of Beezley.  See, e.g., Stark v. St. Mary's 
Hospital, 717 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding in a no-asset 
bankruptcy case a debtor may reopen the estate to add an omitted 
creditor where there is no evidence of fraud or intentional 
design); Robinson v. Mann, 339 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1964) (noting 
in exceptional circumstances, the bankruptcy court may exercise 
its equitable discretion to allow amendment, considering the 
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 In view, however, of allegations of fraud in the 
transaction that gave rise to the underlying claim, the court did 
not decide whether the particular debt at issue was discharged. 
See In re Beezley, 994 F.2d at 1441.  There, the creditor, Cal 
Land, in a memorandum filed in opposition to Beezley's motion to 
reopen, advised the court that it would seek to establish that 
the debt was nondischargeable under section 523(a)(3)(B). 
16 
factors offered in justification of the failure to list the 
creditor in question:  the failure of counsel to have originally 
listed the creditor, the degree of disruption which would result 
from allowing the amendment, and whether any creditor including 
the unlisted creditor would be prejudiced thereby); Stone v. 
Caplan, 10 F.3d 285 (5th Cir. 1994) (allowing out-of-time 
amendments if exceptional circumstances and equity require it). 
Because these cases supplant the analysis required under section 
727(b) and section 523 and substitute a test involving equitable 
considerations completely foreign to these sections of the 
Bankruptcy Code, we disagree.   
 We decline to hold that the issue here, whether Judd's 
debt to Wolfe is discharged pursuant to sections 523(a)(3)(A) and 
727(b), turns on whether the omission of Wolfe from Judd's 
schedules was made in good faith, for the Bankruptcy Code does 
not impose a requirement of good faith for the discharge of an 
omitted debt in a no asset, no bar date case.  "No where in 
section 523(a)(3) is the reason why a debt was omitted from the 
bankruptcy schedules made relevant to the discharge of that 
debt."  In Re Beezley, 944 F.2d at 1439.  As the Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit observed there, such a holding would 
interpose "an equitable barrier between the debtor and his 
discharge that Congress simply did not enact in the Bankruptcy 
Code."  Id.    
 The plain language of section 523(a)(3) represents a 
congressional policy choice.  Clearly, Congress could have 
exempted from the debtor's discharge, pursuant to sections 727(b) 
17 
and 523, debts that were omitted intentionally, rather than 
merely inadvertently, from the debtor's schedules.  Congress 
chose not to do so.  Unless Wolfe can show that his claim falls 
under the statutory exceptions of section 523(a)(2), (4), or (6), 
his debt has been discharged by operation of law.  Wolfe has 
declined to do so. 
 We review a bankruptcy court's refusal to reopen a 
closed case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 350(b) for abuse of 
discretion.  Fourteenth Avenue Security Loan Ass'n v. Squire, 76 
F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1938); Matter of Gershenbaum, 598 F.2d 779 (3d 
Cir. 1979).  Having concluded that Judd's debt to Wolfe was 
discharged by application of statute, we hold that the bankruptcy 
court did not abuse its discretion in declining to reopen her 
case.0 
 
IV. 
 At oral argument, Judd further argued that although 
amending her schedules at this juncture would not affect the 
discharge of her debt to Wolfe, we should nonetheless remand this 
case so that the bankruptcy court may reconsider whether or not 
to reopen Judd's bankruptcy case for the limited purpose of 
adding Wolfe's name to Judd's list of creditors.  Judd asserts 
that as a practical matter, it is important for her to have all 
of her creditors listed so that her schedules accurately reflect 
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 We note that the bankruptcy court's findings with 
respect to any prejudice suffered by Wolfe are of no moment.  The 
type of prejudice alleged by Wolfe is legally irrelevant to 
discharge pursuant to sections 727(b) and 523. 
18 
the discharge of her debts.  Judd asserts that, as a condition of 
acquiring new credit, prospective lenders may require that all 
discharges appear on her schedules.  Because section 350(b) of 
the Bankruptcy Code permits the court to reopen a case "to accord 
relief to the debtor, or for other cause", Judd's arguments may 
have merit in this regard.   
 Here, we are unable to determine whether there may be 
such cause to reopen this matter.  In any event, this issue is 
best addressed by the bankruptcy court in the first instance.   
 We note, however, that allowing Judd to list all of her 
discharged creditors is in keeping with the practical 
considerations pertinent to Chapter 7 debtors, and in keeping 
with the primary purpose of the Bankruptcy Act of affording 
debtors a fresh start.  See, e.g., In re McKinnon, 165 B.R. 55 
(Bankr. D. Maine, 1994) (maintaining the accuracy of a debtor's 
schedules is sufficient cause to reopen a no-asset case).  Not 
only will amending Judd's schedules ensure the comprehensiveness 
of her Chapter 7 discharge, making it easier for her to obtain 
credit in the future, but amending her schedule to add Wolfe as a 
creditor also ensures that if assets are later discovered, Wolfe 
would receive notice to file a proof of claim, enabling him to 
participate in any distribution of Judd's assets.  See In re 
Henson, 70 B.R. 363 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987).  These are 
considerations which, we are confident, the bankruptcy court will 
consider.  We will thus vacate the district court's order and 
remand this case to the district court for reference to the 
bankruptcy court. 
19 
 
